The attack on the Military Intelligence Headquarters in Lisburn. Last orders,1988

 In the 1980's I was determined to strike back at those killing IRA men. Since SAS histories strenuously disavowed most of the blame,notably "Who Dares Wins!" (Tony Geraghty,1980),I decided to attack the organising centre after first approaching my target from the periphery.

 What target on the periphery?

 The mobile 'Q-vans' of the gangster elite.

In my final briefings in August 1988,I fastened on intelligence-led operations to identify mobile Military Intelligence vehicles and numbers of occupants and undercover soldiers and policemen. (Some of the latter were involved in this armed gangsterism).

We too set out to conduct close-quarters surveillance and to use vehicles of similar marque and colour and type with similar registration numbers to smuggle in a large bomb.

I decided to deploy Belfast Intelligence against the Military Intelligence Headquarters at Lisburn.

The earliest reports from the resultant 'shock attack' was to the effect that the bomb we smuggled in using subterfuge,cost six undercover soldiers their lives. Later reports said that two soldiers were killed. It detonated in front of a canteen or command building,memory fails me as to which.

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16.9.2025

This was not my first attack on the British "gangster elite"and Hitler-lovers but let it be remembered that while it may have been the boys of the County Cork who beat the Black and Tans,it was the boys of the County Fermanagh who put manners on the SAS.

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25.9.2025

The incident at Dunloy

In my early time in the IRA, I took an unhealthy interest in our opponents.

In the period of my preparation,I broached the idea of setting a trap for our opponents.

I mentioned the outline of a tactic to kill members of the SAS to Michael Mc Manus or others who I was dealing with.

That plan was to alert the SAS to 'IRA' activity by revealing an arms dump to them and drawing them into their preferred location to observe 'IRA' men coming to the dump.

However,it was not my intention to send IRA men to their death but rather to catch the SAS team out and kill the them by coming around behind them and opening fire.

This tactic was tried out at Dunloy and led to the killing of an SAS man and two IRA men in the period 1981-3.

Thereafter,I decided to use different tactics and give these government assassins absolutely no chance.

Open warfare,1988-1997

 In my final briefings as Director of Operations (Northern Command), I advised once again,"open military warfare" and giving your enemy a chance to defend himself.

In 1983-5 I had ordered the importation of a flame-thrower from a friendly power for the classic 'German' infantry assault. That flame-thrower was imported from Libya.

During the high-point of the activities which came after my briefings,six soldiers were killed at Derryard,Roslea in an interchange of fire using "surprise tactics" and "superiority in weapons and men". 

That was the initial report of casualties.

 Later reports said two soldiers were killed.

 The use of the flame-thrower indicates that their positions were overrun and that six soldiers were,in fact, killed.

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13.9.2023

The four soldiers who survived the exchange of fire,were freed by the IRA as the rules of war dictate. They were unharmed.

I though fanatical in my earlier involvement with the IRA,had counselled releasing some of our adversaries and letting some of those taken into custody by the Counter Intelligence Unit go.

Why so?

Because it was clear that everyone who the IRA got its hands on,was being killed or executed. Bradley who I briefed had to be put in fear of his life to stop him killing more innocent people. I told him that I had cleared his execution with Pat Doherty and would personally kill him for "bringing the IRA and myself into disrepute".

That is what comes of sending a Belfast cornerboy or a boy soldier to do a man's job as the IRA did in its formative years.

I had let three policemen go at Belcoo in August 1982 and was branded an "escapist" by Carron in November 1982 and a "security risk" by Michael Mc Manus and eventually ridiculed as "politically unreliable" by Mc Manus as he beat his retreat into retirement.